YOU ASKED: US COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY VS UK COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY

Looking back on the past 15 years, there is little doubt that the 9/11 attacks profoundly altered the landscape of international security. Although terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon, (it has existed since 66AD with the sicarii, a splinter group of the Hebrew Zealots, whose activities easily fall within the scope of terrorism), the September 11 attacks certainly marked the end of an era and the beginning of another. While the association of transnational terrorism with Islam pre-dated 9/11, was often narrowly limited to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the association of Arabs and Muslims in general with terrorism became the quintessential stereotype evoked in all international security debates, following the 9/11 attacks. Despite the fact that there is no universal agreement regarding the definition of terrorism (as it is dependent on individual worldviews, belief continua and personal experiences) and the debate continues to be contentious, most people agree that terrorism -perceived either as a tactic, a legal term or a political label- is undoubtedly an issue at the forefront of security concerns.

Terrorism: An Evolving Threat

It is no secret that in the wake of 9/11, the threat of militant (predominantly) Islamic terrorism has taken center stage and remains the focal point of the majority of counter terrorism strategies.

The nature of transnational terrorism has changed considerably over the last 25 years; statistically there are fewer international terrorist incidents than in the mid eighties. The Cold War imposed a certain bipolar framework and many of the countries that used to provide support to terrorist groups (e.g. the Soviet bloc) either no longer exist or they now condemn the use of terrorism. This climate has altered the international attitude towards terrorism and has led to 12 United Nations conventions targeting terrorist activity and more importantly, growing, practical international cooperation. Nevertheless, even though the international community and most countries strongly oppose terrorism, some still covertly support it or use terrorism as a constituent of state policy, Iran being a case in point. The regimes of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Afghanistan and even Syria still provide refuge, funding, training facilities and weapons to terrorists. North Korea has increased its material support for terrorist organizations, while Cuba continues to provide safe haven to terrorists. Moreover, terrorist activity thrives in ungoverned areas with weak border control and/or law enforcement, in war-torn areas and failed states. There is also a considerable number of states that still tolerate and/or sponsor terrorist presence. So, it is safe to say that the terrorist threat has yet to be strategically and irreversibly weakened.

Terrorism is also constantly evolving and its ever-changing nature makes it even more difficult to counter. The “war on terror” continues today, even with a slight semantic variation of the notion. Terrorism nowadays has multidimensional perspectives; it is not an identifiable enemy but rather, a tactic. Bin Laden’s rhetoric of archaic, absolutist and textualist Islamic ideology has triggered a war that is still raging on a global scale, not only against the remnants of his original group in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also against similarly motivated jihadist entities elsewhere in the world. The global “war on terror” –led by the U.S. - managed somewhat to weaken AQ’s senior leadership (primarily in South Asia-the group responsible for 9/11) and to severely degrade its operational capabilities to hit the West but did little to stop the spread of radical Islamic ideology and the emergence of like-minded groups predominantly in the Middle East, but also across Asia and North Africa. This has ultimately led to the reduction of the threat from the original A.Q. organization and the expansion of the threat from similar, emerging groups. There has also been a significant operational shift in terrorist tactics, from spectacular attacks with large operational footprints to smaller-scale but highly lethal ones.

 ISIS is currently the world’s largest threat to peace. They are a legitimate rebel force, with a highly sophisticated social media outreach. In its pursuit of annihilating all impediments in order to defeat the West and establish a universal ruling Caliphate, the group is systematically committing atrocities on a global scale. The expanding terrorist threat has led most countries to develop an integrated strategic framework in order to successfully address the drivers of violent extremism.

Comparing the Current UK-US Counter Terrorism Approaches

UK C.T. Approach

The UK policy to countering radicalization and extremist ideology is clearly outlined in the 2011 Prevent Section of CONTEST -the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy- and further revisions / clarifications were published in the 2014 Annual Report on implementation of CONTEST. CONTEST was built around four core pillars -Protect, Prepare, Pursue and Prevent- each of which largely incorporates the principle of deterrence in all its forms. The overarching strategy seeks to establish a connection between a simplistic conception of a collective responsibility to “act” – using terror as a means of coercion- and an aversion toward a tolerant, pluralist, fully functional society. Failure of societal integration leads to the absence of a collective cultural mindset and ultimately, –more often than not- to radicalization, as a means to project one’s ideological convictions, and to some extent to a certain kind of domination. CONTEST’s strategic aim is based on an integrative sense of national belonging, as a method to reduce susceptibility to violent radicalization and recruitment.

UK’s CONTEST strategy is focused on a predominantly preventive framework -as opposed to a punitive legal one-, that seeks to undermine the ideological conviction that leads to radicalization and involves deterrence by counter narrative. The strategy also actively aims to discredit non-violent organizations that legally reproduce extremist narratives and publications that purposely hinder Government efforts to address and prevent violent radicalization. This approach relies on credible voices and channels for strategic messaging to counter radicalization by addressing the social risk factors that contribute to violent extremism. Moreover, this initiative –indirectly- attempts to dry out the breeding ground for online overseas radicalizers (who tend to rely on the Internet as a tool for incitement and recruitment), ultimately preventing them from gaining local influence. The UK approach invests heavily on the utilization of non-government groups that facilitate peer-mentoring of at-risk individuals, offering the adequate counseling and viable alternatives to guide the vulnerable, disenfranchised youth away from radical ideologies. Despite the fact that the UK strategy clearly leans toward a more soft-power programme, (that aims to rehabilitate/de-radicalize convicted jihadists, maximizing their utility) it should be mentioned that the “Prevent” strategy also includes hard-power securitization tactics such as the confiscation of passports, travel bans, the revocation of citizenship for those engaged in terrorist activities, etc.

US C.T. Approach

The overarching underpinnings of the US policy approach are clearly presented in the 2011 “National Strategy for Countering Terrorism” and the aforementioned approach could be easily described as a securitization paradigm. The US strategy could be also characterized as “heavy handed”, mainly because it focuses on hard power tactics to combat terrorism, including: surveillance, monitoring, infiltration, subversion, covert intelligence collection, use of assets, raids, sting operations, detention, arrests etc. The general approach seeks to distant the counter radicalization initiatives from Islamic religious narratives, opting to address the issue (more) as an integrated effort to combat terrorist criminality rather than an errant ideological imperative. In order to achieve that, the US’s counter terrorism strategy includes the operationalization of the conceptualized notion of strategic communication through information operations, media operations and psychological operations (psyops). Strategic communication is critical to security policy development in the US and there has been discussion about creating a multifaceted, more centralized approach aimed at formerly operationalising a counter-radicalisation program, though, as yet, no firm date has been set for completion. For the most part, the US counter terrorism strategy is built around the concept of secularism (the principle of having state and matters of religion separate) and US policy makers vehemently refuse to associate terrorism with Islam, whitewashing the issue as “violent extremism” instead, as a means to avoid provoking the Muslim community. The basic principles guiding the US approach could be summarized as follows: striking no deals with terrorists, no matter the circumstances (non negotiation), isolating and applying pressure on state sponsors forcing them to comply, bringing terrorists to justice and assisting countries that work with the US in the field of counter terrorism in order to bolster their operational capabilities. In reality, few of these principles have actually been implemented, predominantly because the overall approach lacks a solid, centralised strategic plan.

Comparing the two approaches

By comparing the two national approaches, it becomes clear that they combine two essential principles: securitization/justice based counter radicalization programmes and social/community based counter radicalization initiatives. The cardinal difference is the extent to which each country leans towards either soft or hard power biases in their respective strategies. The UK has opted for a soft-powered community engagement and integration approach while the US continues to employ (predominantly) hard powered securitized/legal tactics.

One of the most noticeable differences is the degree to which each government criminalizes contested, offensive or extremist views, particularly those expressed by members of Muslim communities. Although freedom of speech is a principal pillar of both governments, subject-matter expert Tara Quinlan argues that the UK has developed a tendency to easily legislate against allegedly “extremist” speech, even in the absence of a tangible connection to potential violence, as opposed to the US government, which rarely intervenes against the expression of unpopular views, unless directly related to criminal action. This is clearly demonstrated in the UK government’s Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015; the Act places a statutory duty on public institutions (schools, universities, prisons, etc.), to ban expressions of extremist speech in an effort to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism.

The two approaches, however, share a significant similarity: both the US and the UK governments have made substantial efforts to reinforce the idea of “progressive Islam”, an attempt to re-interpret and reform Islamic understanding and practices, so that they gradually become more compatible with Western secular values. By engaging with the media and by partnering with liberal Muslims, both Governments seek to provoke intellectual discourse and to empower liberal/progressive Muslims, in hopes of challenging the extremist ideologies of more radical, fundamentalist groups. The aim is to instigate the idea that the radical interpretations of Islam are in fact incongruous and that the true interpretation of Islam is the moderate view.

Another striking similarity is the fact the both countries have adopted what Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben describe as “state of exception”. The concept of the “state of exception” crudely refers to the implementation of emergency laws during “exceptional circumstances” that free decision-makers from any legal restraints that would normally apply to their power; this includes the curtailing of checks and balances related to government activities and the temporary suspension of legal limitations. It consequently becomes clear that both countries have adopted a stringent legislative regime that has greatly expanded police powers and restrictions on civil liberties. It appears that both countries opt for hard power tactics depending on the situational context, although America clearly has a greater enemy-centric approach, consisting of primarily offensive, hard power tools.

Community Engagement Programmes

On the other hand, the UK has chosen a soft power, population-centric strategy (e.g. the London Metropolitan Police Service’s Muslim Contact Unit or the national PREVENT programme), that contains features such as partnership, cooperation and counter radicalization, focusing on the underlying elements that allow terrorism to thrive.  To what extent these initiatives have been successful in addressing the ill-defined root causes of terrorism, remains to be seen. UK policy makers seem to understand that handling the long-term terrorism threat requires a more versatile approach, combining both hard power and soft power tactics, in such a way that they can be fully compatible and mutually reinforcing.

The U.S. has also invested in community engagement programmes and the White House has expressed, on various occasions, a desire for greater community participation. US’s counter radicalization programmes are relatively more holistic than the UK’s Prevent programme mainly because they include an array of religious groups and ethnic Diasporas, frequently employing aspects of gang prevention tactics. Numerous proactive community engagement partnerships were implemented at the local level- Los Angeles, Boston, Minneapolis, Maryland, etc., an initiative well received by the White House. Nevertheless, the relatively narrow focus could lead to the victimization of specific social groups and to their exploitation, since these connections are also utilized for intelligence-gathering purposes. Relatedly, there has been intense criticism that approaches of this ilk could unintentionally have inverse consequences and could potentially result in further alienation of at-risk groups. Overall, compared to the UK’s Prevent strategy, the US  has only scattered initiatives, lacking a coherent, articulated approach, as well as concrete de-radicalization programmes.

Conclusion

There is a plethora of reasons regarding the differences of UK-US counterterrorism approaches, ranging from sociopolitical factors to historical experiences in dealing with terrorism. There are also different perceptions and cognitive biases as well as different socioeconomic dynamics. Despite certain clear differences, there is an overarching similarity between the two nations; both states seek to “shape” and/or “manipulate” (to a certain extent) the Islamic belief continuum, under the pretense of conducting counter radicalization programmes.

By comparing and analyzing the two approaches, it becomes clear that they both contain some degree of effectiveness. However, in order to maximize their efficacy and public acceptance, policy makers should combine the more successful aspects of each approach in conjunction with an effort to galvanize the grass roots and to work with civil society activists to push back against this extremist theocratic ideology that has permeated vulnerable communities in both countries. These initiatives will take years to bear fruit but without a well-coordinated effort and a strong political will, Islamic extremism is likely to be around for generations.