ARE COUNTER TERRORISM MEASURES REALLY EFFECTIVE? IS THERE A WAY TO MEASURE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS?
Looking back on the past 15 years, there is little
doubt that the 9/11 attacks profoundly altered the landscape of international
security. Over the last decade and a half, there has been a tremendous
multiplication of counter terrorism measures, laws, policies at regional,
national and international levels. The events of 9/11 and -more recently- the
phenomena of ISIS, “homegrown terrorism” and “foreign fighters”, set states and
international bodies on an accelerated path of law making and
institution-building, (Kaunert & Leonard, 2012). Domestic and international
counter terrorism initiatives include specific provisions to permit, require
and fund technologically innovative measures to counter terrorism; thus smart
borders, (smart) surveillance, data retention/collection and sharing, passenger
name record exchange etc., feature heavily in the hyper technologized
operational continuum of contemporary counter terrorism, “where the production,
retention, processing, and deployment of data has taken centre stage”, (De
Londras, p.1., 2017). Although an array
of difficult questions stems from the current risk prevention rationale
regarding counter terrorism practices and the balancing act between security and
democratic oversight, we will take a step back from the specifics of technological
advancements (in relation to counter terrorism measures) to focus on a more
structural, ethical and deontological aspect: effectiveness. It is no secret
that research conducted to evaluate the actual effectiveness of counter
terrorism measures is worryingly insufficient or outright non-existent. Taking
into account that the adoption of certain counter terrorism practices can
potentially have implications with regard to human rights, institutional
liberties, core democratic principles and the Rule of Law, it is crucial that
engaged and systematic efforts in researching the effectiveness of counter
terrorism measures are implemented in a rigorous way. The lack of empirical
research is -by no means- a problem exclusive to counter terrorism but empirical
evaluation is vital in clarifying and debunking prevailing beliefs regarding
counter terrorism practices, (Jackson, 2016). It must be noted, however, that
one can discern a number of challenges and technical difficulties when
attempting to measure the effectiveness of counter terrorism. Van Um and Pisoiu
argue that a major point of contention is the lack of a universally accepted
notion of what an effective counter terrorism policy is supposed to bring
about, (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011). In other words, there is a need for a solid
conceptual framework that could provide a critical overview of effectiveness -understood
in terms of the extent to which objectives for the measures implemented have
been achieved-.
Framing
Context
It is perhaps trite to remark that terrorism –and
counter terrorism for that matter- did not begin on 9/11; rather, terrorism has
long been employed as a modus operandi by organizations and individuals,
attempting to achieve sociopolitical and/or other goals. For certain countries,
violence associated with terrorism has long been a fact of life and many of
these countries have had relevant anti terrorism legislation in place for
years, (Sunga, 1997). Thus, in effect, laws, policies and regulations (occasionally
with a plethora of implications for the social equilibrium) pursuant to a risk
prevention/securitization rationale are nothing new at the domestic level, (de
Londras, 2017).
It is also not the case that the concept of
“transnational terrorism” is fundamentally or qualitatively new. Standard
terrorist operating procedures -i.e. shopping center bombings, assassinations,
suicide bombings, hijackings, civilian aircraft bombings, spree shootings etc.
- were repeatedly observed far before 9/11, (Jarvis, 2008). Nevertheless, 9/11
did represent a significant, path-breaking moment in a broader historical
trajectory, since it was collectively perceived as an unfathomable trauma,
ushering in a qualitatively new time of fear and insecurity, (Jarvis,
2008). Yet, for all of that, it is safe
to say that the September 11 attacks certainly marked the end of an era and the
beginning of another, mainly because they sketched the contours of contemporary
counter terrorism and shaped the context in which the notions of justification,
effectiveness and impact (of counter terrorism measures) are analyzed.
The conceptualization of effectiveness (of counter
terrorism measures) has been complicated by the variability and multidimensionality
of the empirical phenomenon it seeks to describe. In other words, the
understanding of effectiveness is largely dependent on the perspective,
priorities and broader purposes of the person or entity making the assessment,
(SECILE, 2016). In the abstract, effectiveness could be positivistically equated
with “the achievement of general objectives”. In the context of counter terrorism,
however, this simple methodological continuum is complicated by three exogenous
variables: i) the fact that particular counter terrorism measures are part of a
broader operational framework and may have both meta objectives (relating to
overall security matters) and specific objectives (relating to the measure in
particular), ii) the fact that both the meta- and specific objectives may not
be lucidly elaborated iii) the possibility of certain measures devised for one
purpose being applied to other issues or having unexpected effects in relation
to other areas, (SECILE, 2006).
As already suggested, a universally accepted
definition or framework of counter terrorism effectiveness does not exist in
the literature to date, (Van Dongen, 2009). The literature is currently limited
to a hypothesized conceptual self evidence or specific indicators regarding
stand-alone terms such as impact, success, effects, etc., (Van Um & Pisoiu,
2011). Subject-matter expert Martin Mazé defines effectiveness based on whether
the measures “actually make a difference” and particularly focuses on the
societal impact as an effectiveness indicator. He expressly notes that ex post
facto evaluations rely heavily on outputs rather than impact per se;
subsequently the effectiveness analysis “risks excluding key societal
indicators”, (Martin-Mazé, p.5, 2013). It is worth noting at this point that the
societal perception regarding the effectiveness of counter terrorism measures
is also largely determined by three different arguments, central to the
rationality of the Western political discourse: the exception argument, the
balancing metaphor (between security and liberty) and the trade- off model, (de
Londras, 2015). These conceptual continua are the ideological backbone of the
societal perception of CT effectiveness. This (societal) approach of CT effectiveness
is often analyzed through an output-outcome-impact trichotomy, an
epistemological framework originally developed by Young (2001), (Van Um &
Pisoiu, 2011, Martin-Mazé, 2013). Generally speaking, output effectiveness would refer to the adoption of a measure,
policy instrument, or regulation in response to a threat; in this instance, effectiveness
is assessed in relation to the behavior of the policy makers charged with the
implementation, (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011). Outcome effectiveness, contrarily, would examine the direct and
measurable effects that a given policy framework has in real life; as in, it
would also take into account the behavior of the targeted group (in addition to
the policy-makers) in relation to the short-term objectives of the specific CT
policy implemented, such as disrupting the financial flows or the recruitment
process of a terrorist organization, (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011). Finally, impact-effectiveness depends on the
behavior/reaction of the targeted audience alone, with regard to the long term
objective of the CT policy, namely its success or failure in reducing or
stopping terrorism, (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011).
It is interesting to note that the effectiveness
denominator is not something that most legal analyses tend to focus on, in
general; they rather focus on the necessity, legality and proportionality of CT
measures, (Vermeulen et. al., 2013). Vermeulen, Deering and McCarthy argue that
effectiveness is predominantly evaluated in a factual sense and is assessed by
reference to the intended results a CT measure is supposed to produce, (e.g. “expedition
of the prosecution of suspected terrorists or the freezing of suspected
terrorists’ assets”), (Vermeulen et. al., p.16, 2013). The legal perspective may
not directly make out a prima facie case of effectiveness but it does consider
other variables such as whether a CT measure is compliant with democratic
values and principles and/or whether it is “strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation"; thus implicitly taking effectiveness into account as
well, (European Commission Report on CT measures, p.6, 2010).
Measuring
Operational Effectiveness (from a Law-Enforcement Perspective)
A wide spectrum of different methods has been put to
use in the study of CT operational effectiveness, with qualitative methods and
impact effectiveness being the most prevalent epistemological approaches, (Van
Um & Pisoiu, 2011). This “clinical” analysis is somewhat understandable,
since the ultimate objective of any CT measure or policy is to actually have an
effect on terrorism and numbers tend to offer clearer policy-relevant
indicators, (LaFree, 2006; Horgan and Braddock, 2010). However, measuring operational
effectiveness practically can be a frustratingly tedious task, given the large
number of quantitative studies in the field and the difficulty to clearly
establish the reliability and validity of the relevant indicators, (Van Um
& Pisoiu, 2011). One basic factor that influences the overall validity and
reliability of indicators and complicates the structured and systematic
consideration of CT measures, is the fact that most studies focus only on
individual measures -i.e. the increase in law enforcement powers or legislation,
criminalising acts as terrorism, racial profiling or data mining (Omotola,
2008; Harcourt,
2006; Jonas
and Harper, 2006) -, or on a preferential selection thereof i.e. disrupting terrorist
financing, roving patrols, security/defensive barriers, infiltration of
terrorist organizations (Morag, 2005); arrests, sweeps/searches, confiscation
of goods/funds, entering enemy territory, detaining or questioning, foiling
attacks, sting operations, hostile actions (strikes/killings), (Pratto et. al.,
2009). Along similar lines, Hewitt proposes a classification scheme albeit with
largely unspecified criteria; from a law-enforcement stand point, he looks at
anti-terrorist legislation, emergency powers, ceasefire and negotiations and the
use of security forces, (Hewitt, 1984). Occasionally, there is no specific mention
of concrete counter terrorism measures; they are rather evaluated as a whole in
cost-benefit assessments, (Stewart and Mueller, 2009; Zycher, 2009).
In their report regarding the operational perspective,
de Londras, Downing and Doody stress that operational effectiveness is directly
proportional to “the satisfaction at operational level(s) of the original
objectives that were to be achieved by the introduction of a CT policy or
measure”, (de Londras et al, p.17, 2013). Nevertheless, they stress that a
clear rationale for the policy and/or measure in question needs to be
accurately defined along with an adequate monitoring mechanism so that
effectiveness –for all intents and purposes- can actually be assessed, (de
Londras et al, 2013).
It is worth noting that certain studies place a very
high premium on impact effectiveness as
well, with respect to the operational effectiveness of relevant (law
enforcement) CT measures. Impact effectiveness is usually evaluated in relation
to indicators associated with terrorist activity, i.e. a. number of attacks, recidivism
rates for deradicalisation programmes of individuals (Noricks, 2009) and the
degree to which group radicalization programmes are capable of preventing
further terrorist activity (Ashour, 2008). In this context, Horgan and Braddock
propose a more comprehensive assessment scheme, the Multi Attribute Utility
Technology, consisting of two sets of indicators: a. the rate of terrorism, subordinated domestic terror
rates and recidivism and b. the popular support for the government, “boosted
morale and political capital”, (Horgan and Braddock, p.283, 2010). Noricks,
however, notes a major difficulty within this category of effectiveness: the
limited amount and reliability of data, such as the accurate reporting and
tracking of re-arrests in the case of recidivism (Noricks, 2009). Numerous
scholars tend to use instead of impact,
outcome indicators i.e. the number
of killed/arrested terrorists and the destruction of the terrorist
infrastructure (Floros & Newsome, 2009, Schmid & Sing, 2008). It should
be mentioned, nevertheless, that this particular indicator could lead to faulty
assumptions, since operatives are easily replaceable, thus the arithmetic
analogy does not necessarily reveal the potential or the size of a terrorist
organization; therefore any assessments regarding the impact, dynamics or
future attacks would -at best- be probabilistic, (Probst, 2005; Spencer, 2006 ;
Stohl, 2006).
Finally, a comparatively smaller body of literature
uses output effectiveness for the
evaluation of counter terrorism measures. This method is relatively
unproblematic because its indicators are easily delineated. These include the
production of strategies, organization reform and legislation (9/11 Commission
report, 2006), the establishment of authorities or the implementation of
legislation, (Alexander, 2006; Keohane, 2005).
De Londras observes that the introduction (and subsequently
the effectiveness evaluation) of counter terrorism policies -particularly in
the European Union- is generally structured around ex ante impact assessments,
which basically “can only ascertain predicted impacts and thus estimate the
proportionality, effectiveness and appropriateness of the proposed technology
or measure”, (de Londras, p,12, 2017). So, in essence, ex ante impact
assessments are purely speculative and they cannot determine effectiveness as a
matter of fact. She proposes instead an “ex post facto” review, (currently rare
in the context of counter terrorism), of how the measure or technology is
actually working, how it is widely perceived, what its real impact is, how much
it is costing and so on, so that effectiveness can be assessed “in the broad
and vital sense”, (de Londras, p,12, 2017).
In sum, academics have used a wide variety of methods
to assess the overall effectiveness of counter terrorism responses and have
reached very different conclusions regarding how effective counter terrorism
policies actually are.
Conclusion
While effectiveness could be regarded as one of the most
essential aspects of any counter terrorism policy, its study is cumbered by both
epistemological underdevelopment and a lack of a canonical scientific basis.
Conceptually, there is a wide variety of indicators/measures/techniques taken
into consideration, and in numerous categorizations, from comprehensive
strategies to a set of measures and/or individual ones. The incremental
methodological complexity is directly analogous to a series of validity and
reliability issues, which explain the –partly- divergent results obtained.
Another major hindrance is the data availability and quality as well as the
lack of empirical data, the limited nature and/or manipulability of statistics
and the “impossibility of capturing some disruptive successes in statistical
form”, (SECILE, p.25, 2013). The limitations of a statistical and/or
qualitative evaluation should also be born in mind, as statistics are not
necessarily objective and/or exhaustive indicators of effectiveness, (SECILE,
p.27, 2013). In designing mechanisms for evaluating effectiveness, qualitative
empirical research should be conducted, in order to identify potential conditions
that could be operationalized in assessment variables. Furthermore, policy
makers must bear in mind that much of counter terrorism is -in effect- mutative
in nature (shifting threats, priorities, geopolitical realities) and
effectiveness itself may change over time, depending on the particular
circumstances; hence, the effectiveness of CT measures requires constant
re-evaluation, occasionally beyond a statistical and/or quantitative basis.
References:
- Alexander,
Y., (ed.) (2006), “Counterterrorism
Strategies. Successes and Failures of Six Nations”, Potomac Books, Dulles,
Virginia
- Ashour,
O. (2008), “Islamist De-Radicalization in
Algeria: Successes and Failures”, The Middle Eastern Institute Policy
Brief, 21, p. 1–10
- Byman,
D. (2003), “Measuring the War on
Terrorism: A First Appraisal”, Current History, 102(668), p. 411–416
- Della
Porta, D. (1992), “Institutional
Responses to Terrorism”, The Italian Case, Terrorism and Political
Violence, 4(4), p. 151–170
- De
Londras, F., Doody, J., & Downing, E., (2013), “Report on Operational Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy and
Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism” (SECILE Consortium, 2013)
- De
Londras, F. (2017), “Evaluation &
Effectiveness of Counter Terrorism”, Forthcoming in Wim Hardyns, Koen
Ponnet, Genserik Reniers, Wim Smit, Luc Braeckmans & Barbara Segaert (eds),
p.1, Socially Responsible Innovation in Security: Critical Reflections.
-
European
Commission For Democracy Through Law, (2010), Report on Counter Terrorism
Measures and Human Rights, Venice Commission
- Harcourt,
B, (2006), “Muslim Profiles post 9/11: Is
Racial Profiling An Effective Counter Terrorism Measure and Does It Violate the
Right to be Free from Discrimination”, Chicago: The University of Chicago
Law School
- Hewitt,
C. (1984), “The Effectiveness of
Anti-Terrorist Policies”, Lanham, University Press of America
- Horgan,
J. & Braddock, K. (2010), “Rehabilitating
the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization
Programs”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22(2), p. 267–291
- Jackson,
R. (2016), “Critical Terrorism Studies
After 9/11”, Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies Routledge
Jarvis,
L. (2008), “Times of Terror: Writing
Temporality into the War on Terror”, Critical Studies on Terrorism 1 (2):
pp.245-262
- Jonas,
J & Harper, J, (2006), “Effective
Counterterrorism and the Limited Role of Predictive Data Mining”, CATO
Institute.
- Kaunert,
C. & Leonard, S. (2012), “Supranational
governance and European Union Security after the Lisbon Treaty- Exogenous
Shocks, policy entrepreneurs and 11 September 2001” Cooperation and
Conflict Vol. 47, No4
- Keohane,
D. (2005), “The EU and counter-terrorism”,
Centre for European Reform (CER), London
- LaFree,
G. (2006), “Efficacy of Counter Terrorism
Approaches: Examining Northern Ireland”, START Research Brief
- Malvesti,
M. L, (2002), “Bombing bin Laden:
Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy”,
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 26(1), p.17–29
- Martin-
Mazé, M. (2013), “Report on Societal
Understandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Counter-Terrorism
Context” (SECILE Consortium, 2013), pg.5
- Morag,
N. et al. (2005), “Measuring Success in Coping
with Terrorism: The Israeli Case”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
28(4), p. 307–320
- Mueller,
J. & Stewart M.G., (2011), “Terror,
Security and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland
Security”, Paper prepared for presentation at the panel, "Terror and
the Economy: Which Institutions Help Mitigate the Damage?” at the Annual
Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, (April, 2011)
- Newsome,
B., & Floros, C. (2009), “When
international counter-terrorism succeeds: Lessons from the defeat of
'revolutionary organization November 17th” Eds: CC Beyer & M
Bauer, Effectively Countering Terrorism p.141-154, Sussex Academic Press
- Noricks,
E. (2009), “Disengagement and
Deradicalization: Processes and Programs”, In Social Science for
Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together, edited by P.K Davis and K.
Cragin. Santa Monica, RAND, p. 11–70
- Omotola,
S. (2008), “Assessing Counter-Terrorism
Measures in Africa: Implications for Human Rights and National Security”,
Conflict Trends, no. 2, p.41–48
- Perl,
R. (2007), “Combating Terrorism: The
Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness”, CRS Report for Congress, updated
March 2007
- Pratto,
F., Fox, B., Pitpitan, V., Tan, J., Huntington, A., Santos, Jr., E. E., Ravishanker,
N. and Pearson, A. R. (2009), “The
efficacy of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the second intifada: An
intergroup approach”, Working Paper presented at the International Society
for Political Psychology meeting, Dublin, (July 2009)
- Probst,
P. (2005), “Measuring Success in
Countering Terrorism: Problems and Pitfalls”, LNCS 3495, p. 315–325
- SECILE
Consortium, (2013), “The Impact,
Legitimacy & Effectiveness of EU Counter Terrorism”, p.12-30,
- Schmid,
P. & Sing, R. (2009), “Measuring
Success and Failure in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism”, US Government
Metrics of the Global War on Terror. In After the War on Terror: Regional and
Multilateral Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Edited by A. Schmid
and G. Hindle, London: RUSI
- Spencer,
A. (2006), “The Problems of Evaluating
Counter-Terrorism”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 12.
- Stohl,
M. (2006), “Winners and Losers in the War
on Terror: The Problem of Metrics”, Paper Presented at the International
Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, March 2006
- Sunga,
L. (1997), “The Emerging System of
International Criminal Law: Developments in Codification and Implementation”,
Eds: Brill Publishers
- Van
Dongen, T. (2009), “Break it Down: An Alternative Approach to Measuring
Effectiveness in Counter Terrorism”. Economics of Security Working Paper,
no 23
- Van
Um, E & Pisoiu, D. (2011), “Effective Counter Terrorism: What Have We
Learnt So Far?”, Economics of Security Working Paper 55, Berlin: Economics of
Security.
- Vermeulen,
M., Deering, D. & McCarthy, S. (with research assistance from Carolin
Möller), (2013), “Report on Legal Understandings
of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism” p.14-19, (SECILE
Consortium, 2013).
- Zycher,
B. (2003), “A Preliminary Benefit/Cost
Framework for Counterterrorism Public Expenditures”, RAND, Santa Monica
-
I think when it comes to the European Union, they should definitely chang their way of thinking. Clearly countries like Russia or the USA are doing much better in CT. Why is that???? The European mentality will ultimately kill Europe itself
ReplyDelete